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A COUNTERFACTUAL HISTORY OF TRANSGENDER STUDENTS’ RIGHTS 
Kristi L. Bowman* 
ABSTRACT 
Disputes about transgender students’ rights are growing in number and 
prominence.  In spring 2017, when the Trump Administration rescinded the 
Obama Administration’s guidance that had protected transgender students, 
the Supreme Court cancelled oral argument in Gloucester County v. G.G., 
the case it was scheduled to hear on this topic, vacated the lower court’s 
opinion, and remanded the case.  But what if that hadn’t happened?  Spe-
cifically, what if Hillary Clinton had been elected president, the guidance had 
remained in place, and the Court had heard oral argument as originally 
scheduled in Gloucester County?  This piece employs the approach of coun-
terfactual history, presenting what I believe would have been the Court’s 
decision in Gloucester County in an alternate reality: The Supreme Court 
would have sided with student Gavin Grimm on administrative law grounds 
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with Justice Kennedy, the swing vote, giving the liberal justices their fifth 
vote.  Continuing in this parallel universe, I take what surely would have 
been an initial reaction by transgender advocates—that the decision was 
“the Brown v. Board of transgender rights”—and test the limits of that 
statement.  Finally, I return to the present day, reflecting on what we can 
learn from the counterfactual history, considering how that knowledge can 
inform our understanding of what happened and why, discussing the cur-
rent and emerging litigation in this area, and analyzing the importance of 
policy choices at the state and local level. 
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INTRODUCTION  
On March 6, 2017, twenty-two days before the Supreme Court was 
scheduled to hear arguments in Gloucester County v. G.G. about whether 
transgender student Gavin Grimm had a right to enter the public school 
bathroom that is consistent with his gender identity, the Court cancelled 
oral argument and remanded the case to the Fourth Circuit.1  Such an ab-
rupt change of course so late in the game is unusual.  So, why did this hap-
pen, and was the outcome inevitable?  
To make a long story short, in January 2015 and May 2016, the Obama 
Administration’s Departments of Education and Justice issued first a policy 
letter (from Education) and then a significant guidance (from Education and 
Justice) that created new federal legal protections for transgender stu-
dents—notably, requiring schools to use the names and pronouns con-
sistent with students’ gender identity, mandating access to sex-segregated 
activities and facilities consistent with students’ gender identity, and em-
phasizing the impermissibility of gender-based harassment.2  Then, in the 
November 2016 presidential election, Donald Trump prevailed over Hillary 
Clinton.  On February 22, 2017, roughly one month into the Trump Admin-
istration, the Departments of Education and Justice rescinded both the 
2015 letter and 2016 guidance, stating that those documents “do 
not . . . contain extensive legal analysis or explain how the position is con-
sistent with the express language of Title IX, nor did they undergo any for-
mal public process.”3  Thus, federal law no longer protected transgender 
students because of their gender identity.  This change in federal policy 
brought to a close multi-state, high profile challenges to the guidance that 
were under way in Texas and Nebraska.4  
The change in policy also mooted the administrative law question that 
 
 1 137 S. Ct. 1239, 1239 (2017).  
 2 “Dear Colleague” Letter from Catherine E. Lhamon, Asst. Sec’y for C.R. & Vanita Gupta, Principal 
Deputy Asst. Att’y Gen. for C.R. (May 13, 2016); Andrew Mytelka, Trump Administration Rescinds 
Obama-Era Guidance on Transgender Students, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC. (Feb. 22, 2017, 11:00 PM), 
https://www.chronicle.com/blogs/ticker/trump-administration-rescinds-obama-era-guidance-
on-transgender-students/117025. 
 3 “Dear Colleague” Letter from Sandra Battle, Acting Asst. Sec’y for C.R., & T.E. Wheeler, II, Acting 
Asst. Att’y Gen. for C.R. (Feb. 22, 2017).  The 2017 guidance was one of the Trump Administra-
tion’s first forays into education policy.  It was issued one month after the new President took 
office and roughly two weeks after the Senate confirmed Attorney General Jeff Sessions and Sec-
retary of Education Betsy DeVos.  Mytelka, supra note 2.  
 4 Texas v. United States, 201 F. Supp. 3d 810 (N.D. Tex. 2016), order clarified by Order, No. 7:16-CV-
00054-O, 2016 WL 7852331 (N.D. Tex. Oct. 18, 2016); Plaintiffs’ Notice of Voluntary Dismissal 
Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(a)(1)(A)(i), Texas v. United States, No. 7:16-CV-00054-O (N.D. Tex. 
Mar. 3, 2017); Texas v. United States, 679 F. App’x 320 (5th Cir. 2017); Nebraska v. United States, 
No. 4:16-cv-03117-JMG-CRZ (D. Neb. July 8, 2016) (dismissing without prejudice); Catherine Jean 
Archibald, Transgender Bathroom Rights, 24 DUKE J. GENDER L. & POL’Y 1 (2016).  
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was central to Gloucester County and so the Court invited the parties’ 
thoughts about how to proceed. Ultimately, the Court decided to vacate 
the Fourth Circuit’s holding (which had been based on administrative law 
principles including deference to the now-repealed guidance) and ask the 
Fourth Circuit to consider the Title IX statutory interpretation question.5  On 
remand to the Fourth Circuit during spring and summer 2017, the parties 
raised and briefed the issue of mootness due to Gavin Grimm’s June 2017 
high school graduation, in addition to continuing to engage the substantive 
Title IX and Equal Protection questions.  On August 2, 2017, the mootness 
question led the Fourth Circuit to remand the case to the district court for 
further development of the record on that topic, rather than proceeding 
with the appellate oral argument that had been set for September 12, 2017. 
What if the presidential election had gone the other way, though, and a 
Clinton Administration had been implementing policy in education and 
other areas?  Would the Supreme Court have heard Gavin Grimm’s case as 
originally planned?  If so, how would the Court have decided it?  
It is human nature to ask “what if,” and the serious exploration of other 
possible courses of events is counterfactual history.6  Over time, this genre 
has included much speculation about war, peace, and the alignment of na-
tions, and some of its most prominent authors have included Winston 
Churchill, Philip K. Dick, G.K. Chesterton, and Vita Sackville-West. In legal 
scholarship, the many prominent law professors who have contributed to 
books such as What Brown v. Board of Education Should Have Said7 and 
Feminist Judgments: Rewritten Opinions of the United States Supreme 
Court8 have imported this approach to our discipline.  That is not to say that 
the approach is without problems—indeed, in a 2014 article in The New 
Republic, law professor Cass Sunstein agreed with noted historian Dr. Rich-
ard Evans that “[w]e can . . . dismiss counterfactual history when it is based 
on false historical claims [about other known events], wildly elaborate 
causal chains, or all-bets-are-off changes.”9  However, if counterfactual his-
tory does not suffer from these shortcomings, Sunstein continued, it can be 
“legitimate, and even instructive, to ask how things might have turned 
out . . . otherwise” because it ultimately lets us test our explanation about 
 
 5 Thankfully this was less cryptic than the usual “grant, vacate, remand” order entered by the Su-
preme Court.  Erwin Chemerinsky & Ned Miltenberg, The Need to Clarify the Meaning of U.S. 
Supreme Court Remands: The Lessons of Punitive Damages’ Cases, 36 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 513, 513. 
 6 Cass R. Sunstein, What if Counterfactuals Never Existed?, NEW REPUBLIC (Sept. 20, 2014), 
https://newrepublic.com/article/119357/altered-pasts-reviewed-cass-r-sunstein [hereinafter, 
Sunstein, Counterfactuals]. 
 7 WHAT BROWN V. BOARD OF EDUCATION SHOULD HAVE SAID (Jack Balkin ed., 2002). 
 8 FEMINIST JUDGMENTS: REWRITTEN OPINIONS OF THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT (Kathryn M. Stanchi, 
Linda L. Berger & Bridget J. Crawford eds., 2016). 
 9 Sunstein, Counterfactuals, supra note 6. 
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what happened and why.10  It also illuminates other outcomes and lets us 
consider alternative ways to pursue them if they are desirable or to avoid 
them if they are not.  
Thus, assuming a fairly straightforward causal chain—that Hillary Clin-
ton prevailed in the November 2016 presidential election,11 the Obama Ad-
ministration’s 2015 policy letter and 2016 significant guidance regarding 
transgender students remained in place, and Gloucester County was argued 
in the Supreme Court as already briefed and originally scheduled—Part I 
presents a counterfactual history of Gloucester County, including a descrip-
tion of the Court’s “decision” in Gavin Grimm’s favor and an initial analysis 
of the same.  Part II then returns to the present reality and explores what 
this counterfactual history can teach us.12  Ultimately, this piece provides 
the following new insights: First, the presidential election controlled the 
Court’s disposition of Gloucester County.  Second, the current Court would 
have been likely to decide Gloucester County in favor of transgender stu-
dents on administrative law grounds, although this is dependent on Justice 
Kennedy; additionally, Justice Kennedy’s “equal dignity” jurisprudence 
gives lawyers and federal judges much to work with in the Equal Protection 
Clause arena in other transgender cases.  Third, efforts to protect 
transgender students at the state and local level have become even more 
important since the Trump Administration’s policy took effect and repealed 
federal protections.  
I.  JUNE 30, 2017, REIMAGINED 
Today, the Supreme Court held by a vote of 5-3 that transgender boy 
Gavin Grimm other transgender students across the nation may use the 
public school bathrooms consistent with their gender identity.  School dis-
tricts, students, and activists on both sides have eagerly awaited a decision 
in this case since it was argued on March 28.13  So, what did the Justices 
 
 10 Id. 
 11 Neil H. Buchanan, What Would Trump Have Done if Hillary Had Won?, NEWSWEEK (May 7, 2017, 
12:10 AM), http://www.newsweek.com/neil-buchanan-what-would-trump-have-done-if-hillary-
had-won-594652 (writing a counterfactual piece assuming that Clinton had won the election and 
reflecting on her first 100 days in office). 
 12 Notably, this piece makes an argument about how the Court would have decided this case—not 
how it should have.  That said, readers may wish to consult the rich and active literature about 
agency deference as well as sex and gender, for example KIMBERLY A. YURACKO, GENDER 
NONCOMFORMITY AND THE LAW (2016); Cass R. Sunstein, The Most Knowledgeable Branch, 164 U. PA. 
L. REV. 1607 (2016) [hereinafter Sunstein, Branch]; Kevin M. Stack, Interpreting Regulations, 111 
MICH. L. REV. 355 (2012); Sonja K. Katyal, The Numerus Clausus of Sex, 84 U. CHI. L. REV. 389; Erin 
Buzuvis, “On the Basis of Sex”: Using Title IX to Protect Transgender Students from Discrimination 
in Education, 28 WIS. J.L. GENDER & SOC’Y 219 (2013); David J. Barron & Elena Kagan, Chevron’s 
Nondelegation Doctrine, 2001 SUP. CT. REV. 201 (2001).  
 13 This is the date for which oral argument had been set. 
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have to say?  And is Gloucester County is, as some have said, “the 
transgender movement’s Brown v. Board of Education”? 
A.  How Gloucester County Came to the Supreme Court 
The facts of this case and the procedural history are relatively straight-
forward: Gavin Grimm was classified as female at birth, thought of himself 
as male roughly from the age of twelve, was diagnosed with gender dys-
phoria around age fourteen, and then sought to live as a boy.14  For about 
seven weeks during his sophomore year of high school, Gloucester High 
School permitted him to use the boys’ bathroom.15  This practice was dis-
continued when the school board, in response to some parents’ objections 
to Grimm’s use of the boys’ bathroom, adopted a policy that required stu-
dents to use the bathrooms consistent with their biological sex.16  Grimm’s 
options then were to use either the girls’ bathroom or one of three single-
stall, gender-neutral bathrooms in the school.17  Grimm’s parents sued the 
school district, alleging violations of Title IX and the Equal Protection Clause 
and seeking a preliminary injunction to stay the school district’s policy.18  
The district court granted the school district’s motion to dismiss the Title 
IX claim, focusing on the lack of ambiguity in the term “sex,” and thus the 
“plainly erroneous” position taken by the Obama administration that re-
quired transgender students to be allowed to use school bathrooms con-
sistent with their gender identity.  This position, the district court con-
cluded, was “inconsistent with the regulation” and, if permitted, would be 
“‘a new regulation’ through the use of a mere letter and guidance” rather 
than the notice and comment process required by the Administrative Pro-
cedures Act.19  The district court also denied Grimm’s motion for prelimi-
nary injunction on the Equal Protection Clause claim, finding that the bal-
ance of hardships (Grimm’s “claims of stigma and distress” and “the privacy 
interests of the other students protected by separate restrooms”) weighed 
in favor of the other students, and thus the school district.20  
On appeal, the Fourth Circuit reversed, holding that the district court 
“did not accord appropriate deference to the relevant Department of Edu-
 
 14 G.G. ex rel. Grimm v. Gloucester Cty. Sch. Bd., 132 F. Supp. 3d 736, 739–40 (E.D. Va. 2015), rev’d 
in part, vacated in part, 822 F.3d 709 (4th Cir. 2016), cert. granted in part, 137 S. Ct. 369, 196 L. 
Ed. 2d 283 (2016), vacated and remanded, 137 S. Ct. 1239, 197 L. Ed. 2d 460 (2017). 
 15 Id. at 740. 
 16 Id. at 740–41. 
 17 Id. at 741. 
 18 Id. 
 19 Id. at 746.  
 20 Id. at 750. 
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cation regulations” and that it “used the wrong evidentiary standard in as-
sessing [the] motion for a preliminary injunction.”21  More specifically, the 
Fourth Circuit rejected the district court’s conclusions regarding ambiguity 
and plain error, stating that the regulation’s definition of “sex” is ambigu-
ous.  It also concluded the evidentiary standard was inappropriately high.22  
B.  The Court’s Decision23 
Oral argument in Gloucester County took place on March 28, 2017, and 
the Court released its opinion as is customary24 at the end of June, holding 
in favor of student Gavin Grimm 5-3 and grounding its opinion in adminis-
trative law principles.  
When the Court granted certiorari on October 28, 2016, it agreed to 
consider two questions: (1) the Departments’ interpretation of “sex” in Title 
IX as including “gender identity” for the purposes of public school bath-
rooms, and (2) the appropriate degree of deference to an agency letter un-
der the much-disputed “Auer doctrine”—the rule that courts defer to an 
agency’s interpretation of its own regulation unless “plainly erroneous or 
inconsistent with the regulation.”25  Like many cases over the past year and 
a half, Gloucester County was decided by only eight justices.  (After Justice 
Scalia’s unexpected death in February 2016, President Obama’s nomination 
of Justice Merrick Garland was unsuccessful,26 and even after President 
Clinton re-nominated Garland, the Senate did not confirm him until April.27  
Justice Garland chose not to participate in deciding any cases argued before 
he joined the Court, including Gloucester County, although if he had partic-
ipated it is assumed he would have joined the majority, leading to a 6-3 
 
 21 G.G. ex rel. Grimm v. Gloucester Cty. Sch. Bd., 822 F.3d 709, 715 (4th Cir.), cert. granted in part, 
137 S. Ct. 369, 196 L. Ed. 2d 283 (2016), vacated and remanded, 137 S. Ct. 1239, 197 L. Ed. 2d 460 
(2017). 
 22 Id. at 719–22, 725–26. 
 23 Yes, gentle readers, this is the point at which the text departs from reality (with the exception of 
the first two introductory sentences in Part I).  Please note that the quotations and citations in 
this section, however, are authentic unless noted otherwise. 
 24 Casey C. Sullivan, 6 Most Important Supreme Court Decisions of 2016, FINDLAW (Jan. 4, 2017, 5:57 
AM), http://blogs.findlaw.com/supreme_court/2017/01/6-most-important-supreme-court-deci-
sions-of-2016-1.html (“It’s somewhat unnatural to look at Supreme Court cases by calendar year.  
The Court, after all, organizes itself around terms that stretch from October of one year to June 
of the next, with most of the major decisions coming out in June.  That means that almost all of 
this year’s most impactful opinions come from last term.”). 
 25 Auer v. Robbins, 519 U.S. 452, 461 (1997) (internal quotations omitted) (quoting Robertson v. 
Methow Valley Citizens Council, 490 U.S. 332, 359 (1989)). 
 26 Garland was nominated for the Court by President Obama after Justice Scalia’s unexpected death, 
but the Senate refused to grant him a hearing so the seat remained open for the remainder of 
Obama’s term.  See Sarah Lyall, Liberals Are Still Angry, but Merrick Garland Has Reached Ac-
ceptance, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 19, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/02/19/us/politics/merrick-
garland-supreme-court-obama-nominee.html. 
 27 A counterfactual “Justice Garland” is borrowed from Neil H. Buchanan, supra note 11.  
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decision.28) 
In the decision released just days ago, Justice Kagan wrote for the ma-
jority.29  Consistent with her background as an administrative law scholar,30 
Justice Kagan’s opinion engaged the deference question head-on.  The 
Court held that the policy letter and the significant guidance were entitled 
to substantial deference because of the high level of the government offi-
cials involved.31  Furthermore, the Court held under Auer that the agency’s 
interpretation was not “plainly erroneous or inconsistent with the regula-
tion” given Title IX’s silence—and thus ambiguity—on the matter of how to 
determine the “sex” of transgender students for purposes of restroom ac-
cess.32  At a more general level, the Court’s opinion echoed Justice Kagan’s 
earlier comments in dissent in the 2015 decision Michigan v. E.P.A.33 and 
law professor Cass Sunstein’s argument that agency deference is important 
because “most of the time, the executive branch knows incalculably more 
 
 28 See Dave Boyer, Obama Loses Merrick Garland Battle—but Reshapes Federal Courts for Decades 
to Come, WASH. TIMES (Dec. 25, 2016), https://www.washington-
times.com/news/2016/dec/25/obama-loses-merrick-garland-battle-but-reshapes-fe/ (discussing 
Garland’s likely alliance with the Court’s “liberal bloc” and Obama appointees’ tendency to give 
great deference to government agencies).  Although justices have not participated in deciding 
cases that were argued before they joined the Court (with Justices Kennedy and Alito most re-
cently being in this position), there is no bar to a justice doing so.  See Tony Mauro, How a New 
Supreme Court Justice Could Hit the Ground Running—Or Not, LAW.COM (Jan. 11, 2017), 
https://www.law.com/almID/1202776610089/. 
 29 Prominent administrative law scholar Kristin Hickman writes, “[N]one of Justices Kennedy, Breyer, 
Ginsburg, Kagan, or Sotomayor has joined in any of the calls to reconsider the validity of the Auer 
standard.  Among that group, some obviously care little about the nuances of judicial deference 
doctrine, while others will simply have a completely different view of separation of powers prin-
ciples from Justices Scalia and Thomas.”  Kristin E. Hickman, Contemplating a Weaker Auer Stand-
ard, YALE J. ON REG.: NOTICE & COMMENT (Sept. 23, 2016), http://yalejreg.com/nc/contemplating-a-
weaker-auer-standard-by-kristin-e-hickman/. 
 30 See, e.g., Elena Kagan, Presidential Administration, 114 HARV. L. REV. 2245, 2372–83 (2001); Barron 
& Kagan, supra note 12. 
 31 Kagan, supra note 30; Barron & Kagan, supra note 12.  I am indebted to Gabrielle Fournier, MSU 
Law Class of 2017, and Morgan Lear, MSU Law Class of 2018, for this idea.  Furthermore, in their 
unpublished papers in my seminar, Lear thoughtfully argued that Kagan would be especially likely 
to extend deference because James Ferg-Cadima, as Acting Deputy Assistant Secretary for Policy, 
is not a mid-level bureaucrat but rather a high-level official due to his responsibility for OCR’s Title 
IX-related policies, and Fournier convincingly argued that the involvement of individuals at high 
levels in the Obama Administration in transgender student policies would support a greater level 
of deference, from Kagan’s perspective.  
 32 Auer v. Robbins, 519 U.S. 452, 461 (1997) (internal quotations omitted) (quoting Robertson v. 
Methow Valley Citizens Council, 490 U.S. 332, 359 (1989)).  
 33 135 S. Ct. 2699, 2718 (2015) (arguing that courts should defer to agencies’ regulatory choices on 
matters where the statute is silent). 
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than other branches, and when it does not know something, it is in an ex-
cellent position to find out.”34  Justices Breyer,35 Kennedy,36 Ginsburg, and 
Sotomayor37 joined the majority opinion.  Justice Ginsburg wrote separately 
to engage the Title IX issue and thus situate this case in the trajectory of 
battles for sex and gender equality.38  
Justice Kennedy also wrote separately, building on his approach in the 
same-sex marriage cases United States v. Windsor39 and Obergefell v. 
Hodges40 and emphasizing the importance of the dignity principles in-
volved.41  As usual, Justice Kennedy was expected to be the swing vote and 
scholars and commentators speculated about whether he would continue 
 
 34 Sunstein, Branch, supra note 12, at 1613 (“With respect to the acquisition of information, the 
executive branch is usually in a far better position than the legislative and judicial branches.  It 
has a large stock of specialists, often operating in teams, and the teams often have an impressive 
degree of epistemic diversity.  Some of those specialists have spent many years studying and 
working on the subject.  Of course, the executive branch’s capacity to obtain information is far 
from perfect.”) 
 35 Breyer has long been deferential to administrative agencies.  See, e.g., Christensen v. Harris Cty., 
529 U.S. 576, 596–97 (2000) (Breyer, J., dissenting); STEPHEN BREYER, REGULATION AND ITS REFORM 
(1982); Stephen Breyer, Judicial Review of Questions of Law and Policy, 38 ADMIN. L. REV. 363 
(1986); Ernest Gellhorn, Justice Breyer on Statutory Review and Interpretation, 8 ADMIN. L.J. 755 
(1995); Lisa Heinzerling, Justice Breyer’s Hard Look, 8 ADMIN. L.J. 767 (1995); Richard J. Pierce, Jr., 
Justice Breyer: Intentionalist, Pragmatist, and Empiricist, 8 ADMIN. L.J. 747 (1995) (discussing Jus-
tice Breyer’s pattern of giving great deference to administrative agencies).  My argument benefits 
greatly from the research of Brenna Jardine, MSU Law Class of 2017, on this point.  
 36 Justice Kennedy joined the majority in Auer and subsequently upheld it, writing for the majority 
in Gonzales v. Oregon, 546 U.S. 243 (2006) and Decker v. Nw. Envtl. Def. Ctr., 133 S. Ct. 1326 
(2013).  I am thankful to Alicia Abella, MSU Law Class of 2017, and Kaitlin Klemp, MSU Law Class 
of 2018, for influencing my thinking on Kennedy’s approach. 
 37 Brianna Venturo, MSU-Law Class of 2018, persuaded me that as much as Justice Sotomayor would 
be drawn to the practical impact of this policy and decision on students and the equality issues, 
she would be likely to decide it on administrative law grounds.  Cf. Perez v. Mortg. Bankers Ass’n., 
135 S. Ct. 1199 (2015). 
 38 It is difficult to imagine that Justice Ginsburg, feminist icon and author of United States v. Virginia, 
518 U.S. 515 (1996), would not want to situate this case in its historical context.  The 2004 Colum-
bia University symposium “Celebration of the Tenth Anniversary of Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg’s 
Appointment to the Supreme Court of the United States” contains many pieces that analyze Jus-
tice Ginsburg’s commitment to the equality of women and other historically marginalized groups.  
See, e.g., Deborah Jones Merritt & David M. Lieberman, Ruth Bader Ginsburg’s Jurisprudence of 
Opportunity and Equality, 104 COLUM. L. REV. 39 (2004); see also Jeffrey Toobin, Heavyweight: How 
Ruth Bader Ginsburg Has Moved the Supreme Court, NEW YORKER (Mar. 11, 2013), 
https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2013/03/11/heavyweight-ruth-bader-ginsburg.  
 39 133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013). 
 40 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015).  
 41 The conventional wisdom seemed to be that Justices Kagan, Breyer, Ginsburg, and Sotomayor 
would side with the student, while Justice Kennedy would be the swing vote.  See, e.g., Steve 
Sanders, Why the Supreme Court Should Dismiss the Gavin Grimm Case, ACSBLOG (Feb. 27, 2017), 
https://www.acslaw.org/acsblog/why-the-supreme-court-should-dismiss-the-gavin-grimm-case.  
I agree with this, and ultimately I am convinced that, given Justice Kennedy’s leading role and 
rhetoric in Obergefell especially, that he would have viewed this as, first and foremost, an anti-
discrimination case and sided with the four justices noted above.  See generally Laurence H. Tribe, 
Equal Dignity: Speaking Its Name, 129 HARV. L. REV. F. 16 (2015).  
Jan. 2018] COUNTERFACTUAL HISTORY 11 
his recent pattern of siding with the sexual orientation minority group, ex-
tending that pattern to include gender identity, or whether he would be 
swayed by the defendants’ arguments about the appropriate structure and 
allocation of power within government.42 
There are a number of ways to explain Justice Kennedy’s outcome.  For 
example, some speculate that Justice Kennedy’s opinions in sexual orienta-
tion cases are explained by wanting to be on the “right side of history,”43 
which is consistent with the gender identity issue in Gloucester County be-
cause younger adults are more supportive of transgender rights and ac-
ceptance of transgender individuals in general appears to be moving rela-
tively quickly, although public opinion research has only recently begun 
tracking opinions about transgender identity and rights.44  Relatedly, the 
outcome also is consistent with commentator William Marks’ and law pro-
fessor Suzanna Sherry’s hypothesis that Justice Kennedy’s outcomes in 
 
 42 See, e.g., Will Marks, Whose Majority Is It Anyway? Elite Signaling and Future Public Preferences, 
4 J.L. (1 NEW VOICES) 13, 22–24 (2014); Sanders, supra note 41; Eric Sasson, The LGBT Movement’s 
Supreme Court Hero: Anthony Kennedy, NEW REPUBLIC (June 26, 2015), https://newrepub-
lic.com/article/122182/lgbt-movements-supreme-court-hero-anthony-kennedy. 
Additionally, prominent administrative law scholar Kristin Hickman wrote in September 
2016 that she did not expect the Court to overturn Auer in Gloucester County—in addition to 
counting the justices, Hickman commented “overturning a standard of review that dates back 
more than seventy years and has been applied in hundreds of cases is not something the Court is 
likely to take lightly.”  Hickman, supra note 29.  
 43 Michael Klarman, Opinion, Gay Rights May Get Its Brown v. Board of Education, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 
11, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/10/12/opinion/gay-rights-may-get-its-brown-v-
board-of-education.html (“Justice Kennedy’s opinions often suggest that he wants to be on 
the right side of history, which matters greatly here because the future of gay marriage in Amer-
ica is so clear.”) 
 44 ANDREW FLORES, TAYLOR N.T. BROWN & ANDREW S. PARK, WILLIAMS INST., PUBLIC SUPPORT FOR 
TRANSGENDER RIGHTS: A TWENTY-THREE COUNTRY SURVEY 8 (2016).  For example, in a 2016 poll con-
ducted in Arizona, roughly 32% of respondents age 51 or older said transgender individuals should 
be able to use the bathroom of the gender with which they identify, compared to 45% of the 
group aged 36–50 and 51% of those aged 18–35.  Alia Beard Rau, Poll: Education, Age, Influence 
Stance on Transgender Bathroom Issue, AZCENTRAL (Oct. 23, 2016, 6:03 AM), https://www.azcen-
tral.com/story/news/politics/arizona/2016/10/23/poll-arizona-bathroom-access-
transgender/92483910/; see also Frank Newport, Disentangling Attitudes Toward Transgender 
Bathroom Use, GALLUP (May 20, 2016), http://news.gallup.com/opinion/polling-mat-
ters/191774/disentangling-attitudes-toward-transgender-bathroom.aspx?version=print (stating 
that the American public has yet to form strong opinions about transgender bathroom use, mak-
ing the interpretation of polls on the matter difficult); Andrew McGill, Americans Are Embracing 
Transgender Rights, ATLANTIC (Aug. 25, 2016), https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/ar-
chive/2016/08/americans-are-embracing-transgender-rights/497444/ (suggesting that American 
views of transgender individuals are changing rapidly because there has been an increase in peo-
ple who know transgender individuals).  
Public opinion research about this issue is admittedly difficult given the relatively recent 
high level of visibility of transgendered individuals—Gallup, which has polled about attitudes to-
wards gay and lesbian individuals since at least 1977, apparently only began polling about atti-
tudes towards transgender individuals in 2016.  Gay and Lesbian Rights, GALLUP, http://www.gal-
lup.com/poll/1651/gay-lesbian-rights.aspx (last visited Dec. 22, 2017). 
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equality-based cases track the opinion of current “elites.”45 As evidence of 
elite opinion, support for transgender rights is higher among more edu-
cated adults,46 and the amici supporting Gavin Grimm included corporate 
powerhouses such as Amazon.com, Apple, IBM, Microsoft, and others,47 as 
well as leading associations of medical professionals such as the American 
Academy of Pediatrics, American College of Physicians, American Psychiat-
ric Association, American Academy of Child and Adolescent Psychiatry, 
American Academy of Family Physicians, and the American Academy of 
Nursing.48  
Chief Justice Roberts dissented49 and was joined by Justices Thomas50 
and Alito.51  As expected, the dissent also focused on the administrative law 
question.  The dissent declined to apply Auer, contending that, as in Gonza-
les v. Oregon, the ambiguity (the word “sex”) was identical in the statute 
and the regulation.  Furthermore, the dissent criticized the majority’s use 
of Auer at length, which two commentators summarized as follows: the 
doctrine “undermines the separation of powers, defeats the purposes of 
notice-and-comment as set forth in the Administrative Procedure Act, 
thwarts the protections of judicial review of agency rulemaking, and en-
courages regulatory brinkmanship without full consideration of congres-
sional will or practical consequences.”52 Before the case was decided, some 
 
 45 William Marks & Suzanna Sherry, Whose Majority is it Anyway? Elite Signaling and Future Public 
Preferences, 4 J.L.: PERIODICAL LAB. OF LEGAL SCHOLARSHIP 13, 22-24 (2014). 
 46 FLORES ET AL., supra note 44, at 8; Rau, supra note 44.  
 47 Brief for Amici Curiae Apple et al. in Support of Respondent at add. 1, Gloucester Cty. Sch. Bd. v. 
G.G. ex rel. Grimm, No. 16-273 (U.S. S. Ct. Mar. 1, 2017); see also Brief for Amici Curiae Apple, IBM 
Corporation, Microsoft, and 56 Other Companies, G.G. ex rel. Grimm v. Gloucester Cty. Sch. Bd., 
869 F.3d 286 (4th Cir. 2017) (No. 15-2056). 
 48 Brief of Amici Curiae American Academy of Pediatrics et al. in Support of Respondent, at 1a, 
Gloucester Cty. Sch. Bd. v. G.G. ex rel. Grimm, No. 16-273 (U.S. S. Ct. Mar. 2, 2017); see also Brief 
of Amici Curiae Paul R. McHugh et al., G.G. ex rel. Grimm v. Gloucester Cty. Sch. Bd., 869 F.3d 286 
(4th Cir. 2017) (No. 15-2056). 
 49 See Decker v. Nw. Envtl. Def. Ctr., 133 S. Ct. 1326, 1339 (2013) (Roberts, C.J., concurring) (inviting 
a case that properly raises the issue in which the Auer doctrine could be considered); Hickman, 
supra note 29 (noting Chief Justice Roberts’ willingness to reconsider Auer given adequate briefing 
on the matter). 
 50 See Perez v. Mortg. Bankers Ass’n, 135 S. Ct. 1199, 1213–14 (Thomas, J., concurring) (noting his 
support for overruling Auer); John C. Eastman, The President’s Pen and the Bureaucrat’s Fiefdom, 
40 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 639, 641–43 (2017) (chronicling Justice Thomas’s criticism of Auer). 
 51 Justice Alito joined Chief Justice Roberts’ concurrence in Decker, 133 S. Ct. at 1339 (Roberts, C.J., 
concurring), expressed support for Justices Scalia’s and Thomas’s views of Auer in Perez, 135 S. 
Ct. at 1213 (Scalia, J., concurring); id. at 1213–14 (Thomas, J., concurring), and chipped away at 
Auer in Christopher v SmithKline Beecham Corp., 567 U.S. 142, 155–59 (2012).  Hickman, supra 
note 29.  
 52 Ilya Shapiro & David McDonald, Gloucester County School Board v. G.G.: Judicial Overdeference Is 
Still a Massive Problem, 18 FED. SOC’Y REV. 8, 9 (2017).  To be clear, this is an actual quotation and 
although Shapiro and McDonald were writing about the Gloucester County case and the short-
comings, in their view, of the Auer doctrine, they were not summarizing a dissent in a case that 
was never argued.  
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commentators speculated that had Justice Scalia not passed away unex-
pectedly in February 2016,53 the case would have been a certain victory for 
the school district; however, the 5-3 outcome demonstrates that even if 
Justice Scalia had participated and aligned with his fellow conservatives as 
he was certain to do,54 Grimm still would have prevailed 5-4 unless Justice 
Kennedy, too, had held for the school district.  
Although Gloucester County established transgender students’ bath-
room access rights, it did so as the result of an administrative law interpre-
tation and not a constitutional principle.  It is expected that a different ad-
ministration could reverse course, and also that the Court will continue to 
vacillate regarding the broader issue of agency deference.55  Indeed, the 
Auer doctrine is part of a much larger conversation addressing fundamental 
questions about the role of the federal government and the relationship 
among its branches.56  
C.  The Transgender Community’s Brown v. Board of Education? 
Not surprisingly, Gloucester County was hailed by transgender students 
and their allies as a “path breaking decision” and “the Brown v. Board of 
Education of transgender rights.”57  Brown is the yardstick against which 
social movements measure their legal victories, and fittingly so: A half cen-
tury after Brown was decided, Brown Attorney Jack Greenberg character-
ized the decision as an event that broke the ice for racial equality, paving 
the way for significant legal changes in all three branches of the federal gov-
ernment as well as social action.58  The Brown comparison is complex59 and 
 
 53 Lyall, supra note 26. 
 54 See Perez, 135 S. Ct. at 1213 (Scalia, J., concurring) (calling for the Court to overrule Auer); East-
man, supra note 50, at 642–43. 
 55 Richard J. Pierce, Jr., The Future of Deference, 84 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1293, 1300, 1306, 1313–14 
(2016). 
 56 See Kristin Hickman, The Three Phases of Mead, 83 FORDHAM L. REV. 527, 528–29 (2014) (discussing 
how congressional delegation guides Chevron’s scope and whether Congress considers judicial 
deference when it drafts legislation).  See generally Barron & Kagan, supra note 30 (discussing the 
relationship between Congress and the judiciary after Chevron); Kristin Hickman & Nicholas R. 
Bednar, Chevron’ s Inevitability, 85 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1392 (2017) (finding that judicial Chevron 
doctrine is not declining, but that Congress has relied too heavily on administrative agencies to 
resolve major policy issues).  
 57 These fictitious comments are reflective of the way we often talk about major cases.  See, e.g., 
Klarman, supra note 43; Adam Liptak, Supreme Court Won’t Hear Challenge to Assault Weapons 
Ban in Chicago Suburb, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 7, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/12/08/us/su-
preme-court-will-not-hear-challenge-to-assault-weapons-ban-of-highland-park-ill.html.  
 58 Jack Greenberg, Brown v. Board of Education: An Axe in the Frozen Sea of Racism, in THE PURSUIT 
OF RACIAL AND ETHNIC EQUALITY IN AMERICAN PUBLIC SCHOOLS 61, 74–75 (Kristi Bowman ed., 2015). 
 59 See Ilya Somin, Opinion, Sex Discrimination and the Transgender Bathroom Case, WASH. POST, (Oct. 
31, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/volokh-conspiracy/wp/2016/10/31/sex-dis-
crimination-and-the-transgender-bathroom-case/?utm_term=.c9a5fad0e7c9 (arguing that 
Gloucester County “is not like Brown” because “[t]ransgender rights advocates are not seeking to 
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worth exploring; thus it is the theme that connects the following initial re-
flections on the Court’s recent decision which begin by analyzing Gloucester 
County’s expected practical and symbolic societal effects, continue by con-
sidering direct effects on other areas of federal law, and conclude by iden-
tifying and discussing some of the many legal questions Gloucester County 
leaves unanswered.  
1.  Societal Ripple Effects  
Years from now, it may be that the details of the Court’s reasoning in 
Gloucester County pale in comparison to the practical and symbolic signifi-
cance of the outcome.  Like Brown, initial reaction will be varied, and the 
near- and long-term indirect effects of the decision have the potential to be 
significant.  
Let us begin by considering initial reactions to these decisions.  Histori-
ans John Hope Franklin and Alfred A. Moss, Jr., and legal scholar Michael 
Klarman all write with great nuance about the direct and indirect impact of 
Brown.  Among other things, these authors and others describe the initial 
reactions to Brown as a continuum: at the most general level, at one end 
was the violent and virulent backlash common across the American South;60 
in the middle was the formal acceptance in the Border States with limited 
immediate impact (though these states also included pockets of deep re-
sistance);61 and at the other end was the celebration in African-American 
communities, the significance of which is difficult to overstate.62  Klarman 
also argues that Brown’s direct effects—the desegregation of schools—are 
only one aspect of Brown’s importance, and perhaps not even the most sig-
nificant one.  Thus, Klarman contends, Brown is also noteworthy because it 
“forced people to take a position on school segregation,” “unquestionably 
 
abolish all sex discrimination in bathroom facilities” but only to “have transgender students as-
signed to bathrooms on the basis of their sense of identity rather than biology”). 
 60 JOHN HOPE FRANKLIN & ALFRED A. MOSS, JR., FROM SLAVERY TO FREEDOM: A HISTORY OF AFRICAN AMERICANS 
453–54 (8th ed. 2000); MICHAEL J. KLARMAN, FROM JIM CROW TO CIVIL RIGHTS: THE SUPREME COURT AND 
THE STRUGGLE FOR RACIAL EQUALITY 348, 351–60, 385–421 (2004).  Across the South, states and school 
districts resisted Brown’s mandate. Three years after Brown was decided, almost no schools in 
the South were desegregated.  KLARMAN, supra at 348, 351.  Those that desegregated in the fol-
lowing decade did so because of court orders, and until 1964, the lawsuits were brought only by 
individual plaintiffs and usually supported by the NAACP, and even then, judges often were in-
clined to let the litigation move slowly.  Id. at 351–60.  More publicly, massive resistance took 
root; those who supported desegregation often were the victims of violence.  Id. at 351–53, 385, 
389–92, 410–15, 421.  The 1956 Southern Manifesto—rejecting Brown wholesale—bore the sig-
natures of 19 Southern Senators and 77 Congressmen.  See id. at 390, 397, 401, 410, 414, 416 
(describing the objectives and the effects of the Southern Manifesto).  In a nutshell, after Brown, 
Southern racial politics radicalized.  Id. at 385, 387, 389–99, 401–08, 421.  
 61 KLARMAN, supra note 60 at 345–48. 
 62 Id., at 368–77, 381–82, 384. 
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motivated [African Americans] to challenge” segregation, and also “radical-
ized southern politics” in a way that enabled Massive Resistance and thus 
“ultimately rallied national opinion behind the enforcement of Brown and 
the enactment of civil rights legislation.”63  It is useful to import this frame-
work to Gloucester County. 
Initial reactions to Gloucester County seem likely to follow a similar pat-
tern.  Indeed, transgender individuals’ rights seem to be at the center of a 
new culture war.64  Thus, those who oppose such rights in conservative 
states and in conservative enclaves of moderate or liberal states will con-
test the legitimacy of the Court, accusing the Court of “judicial activism” 
and “social engineering.”65  Those who are in the equivalent of border states 
or communities may already have begun to figure out informal ways to ac-
commodate transgender students in their schools, and now will take more 
formal steps.  Indeed, because the long-term direction—transgender indi-
viduals will be permitted and accepted in sex-segregated spaces consistent 
with their gender identity—seems clear for reasons described below, the 
border-state approach is preferable because it minimizes the harms to 
transgender students in the interim.  Finally, those who are transgender 
themselves or transgender allies will, indeed, celebrate and feel validated 
 
 63 Id., at 365, 368, 385. 
 64 See Eric Bradner, Democrats Say They’re Ready for a Culture War as Trump Bans Transgender 
People from Military Service, CNN (July 27, 2017, 8:11 AM), 
http://www.cnn.com/2017/07/27/politics/trump-transgender-military-ban-politics/index.html 
(calling President Donald Trump “a culture warrior” and noting that Democrats, in response to 
President Trump’s transgender military ban, are prepared to stand up for economic and social 
issues at the midterm elections); Frederick M. Hess, New Transgender Rules Are About Obama’s 
Culture War, NAT’L REV. (May 16, 2016), http://www.nationalreview.com/node/435416 (criticizing 
the Obama Administration’s guidance letter on transgender students’ rights, noting that, with the 
letter, “[t]he administration went out of its way to seek a culture clash”); Sanders, supra note 41 
(acknowledging the “culture war” that conservatives have waged against trans people); Alex 
Shepard, Trump Wants a Culture War.  Are Democrats Ready to Fight Back?, NEW REPUBLIC (July 
28, 2017), https://newrepublic.com/article/144092/trump-wants-culture-war-democrats-ready-
fight-back/ (observing that Democrats’ “Better Deal” agenda for the 2018 midterms is “not a rad-
ical document” because it does not address “cultural minefields” like immigration or abortion but 
rather more “economic bread-and-butter issues” as a reaction to President Trump’s success in 
the 2016 Presidential Election); Bill Scher, Democrats Can’t Escape the Culture War, POLITICO MAG. 
(July 27, 2017), https://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2017/07/27/democrats-cant-escape-
the-culture-war-215430/ (discussing how the Trump Administration’s transgender military ban 
has drawn Democrats into a culture war );.  
 65 See WALTER A. JACKSON, GUNNAR MYRDAL AND AMERICA’S CONSCIENCE: SOCIAL ENGINEERING AND RADICAL 
LIBERALISM, 1938-1987,  at 296–98 (1990) (discussing the strategic approach employed by both 
President Kennedy and President Johnson to achieve the social results they sought by enacting 
legislation and thus moving civil rights issues “from the streets to the courts”); ELIZABETH H. 
SLATTERY, HOW TO SPOT JUDICIAL ACTIVISM: THREE RECENT EXAMPLES 2-3 (June 13, 2013), http://re-
port.heritage.org/lm96 (“[A] simple working definition is that judicial activism occurs when judges 
fail to apply the Constitution or laws impartially according to their original public meaning . . . or 
do not follow binding precedent of a higher court and instead decide the case based on personal 
preference.”). 
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by the decision.  These indirect effects are far from unimportant.  
The indirect effects of Gloucester County, both supporting and resisting 
the decision, will play out for many years.  It seems that as with Brown, 
Gloucester County will “force[] people to take a position”66 on the issue of 
transgender rights, and thus the intensity and significance of any contro-
versy will escalate as school districts and states grapple with their own pol-
icies and practices.  This is likely to heighten sensitivities around the issue 
and fuel backlash.  Additionally, the backlash could catalyze political action 
and influence the next presidential election, although it is years away.  This 
is more likely in this instance because Brown was rooted in the Fourteenth 
Amendment, but Gloucester County was about deference to a federal ad-
ministrative agency; thus, a presidential administration with a different ap-
proach could reverse course on protections for transgender students.    
Whether or not backlash is greater than current resistance, and whether 
or not the federal protections remain in force after the next presidential 
election, the importance of the decision to transgender students and their 
allies today cannot be overstated.  Like Brown, the direct effects of Glouces-
ter County will be measurable—schools will keep records about students’ 
sex classification changing to reflect their gender identity, and presumably 
data will be collected about compliance and inclusion in school communi-
ties.67 
The direct and indirect effects are important because transgender stu-
dents’ experiences while in school have been more negative than the expe-
riences of any other sexual orientation or gender identity group.68  First, as 
a 2015 nationwide survey of over 10,000 LGBTQ students documented, 
“three quarters of transgender students (75.1%) felt unsafe at school be-
cause of their gender expression.”69  Second, about 40% of survey respond-
ents reported hearing negative comments about transgender people “often 
or frequently” and “[u]nlike biased remarks heard from other students, 
LGBTQ students heard school staff make negative remarks about gender 
expression more frequently than homophobic remarks.”70  Third, LGBTQ 
 
 66 KLARMAN, supra note 61, at 363. 
 67 See FRANKLIN & MOSS, supra note 60 at 472–73 (describing studies and research on “African Amer-
icans’ place in American social and economic life”). 
 68 JOSEPH C. KOSCIW ET AL., GLSEN, THE 2015 NATIONAL SCHOOL CLIMATE SURVEY: THE EXPERIENCES OF LESBIAN, 
GAY, BISEXUAL, TRANSGENDER, AND QUEER YOUTH IN OUR NATION’S SCHOOLS 84 (2016).  Economist and 
education scholar Joseph Cimpian has cautioned about the difficulty of conducting quantitative 
research regarding sexual and gender minority youth and has identified various ways in which 
error and bias may be present in this type of research.  See generally Joseph R. Cimpian, Classifi-
cation Errors and Bias Regarding Research on Sexual Minority Youths, 46 EDUC. RESEARCHER 517 
(2017). 
 69 KOSCIW ET AL., supra note 68, at 7, 84.  
 70 Id. at 18–19. 
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students report missing school because they experienced physical and ver-
bal harassment, and thus it is not surprising that the greater the perceived 
hostility of a student’s environment, the lower the students’ GPA.71  Fourth, 
transgender students attempt suicide at an unusually high rate.  Specifi-
cally, the lifetime rate of attempted suicide in the transgender community 
(41%) is roughly ten times the rate in the total population (4.6%), and even 
higher than in the gay, lesbian, and bisexual community (10–20%).72  Of 
transgender adults who reported attempting suicide, 73% reported that 
their first attempt was while they were age 17 or younger,73 and attempts 
were higher among those who had negative experiences due to their 
transgender status at school (52%, compared to 37% of those who did not 
report such negative experiences at school).74  
Fortunately, recent research about the effect of the legalization of 
same-sex marriage suggests that changes in law can be related to more pos-
itive health and well-being outcomes for individuals.  Specifically, a 2017 
article in the Journal of American Medicine—Pediatrics concluded: “[I]mple-
mentation of same-sex marriage policies [by state legislatures] was associ-
ated with a significant decrease in the proportion of high school students 
attempting suicide . . . equivalent to a 7% decline [and the reduction was] 
concentrated among students identifying as [gay, lesbian, or bisexual].”75  
The researchers continued, “We estimated that, each year, same-sex mar-
riage policies would be associated with more than 134[,]000 fewer adoles-
cents attempting suicide.”76  If the legalization of same-sex marriage repre-
sents acceptance of gay, lesbian, and bisexual people and is associated with 
reduced suicide rates within that population, it is not unreasonable to as-
sume that the legal protection of transgender individuals at some level 
would similarly represent acceptance and also be associated with reduced 
suicide attempts among students, especially (considering the research dis-
cussed above) if the protection occurs at school.  It also is reasonable to 
assume that greater protections for transgender students at school may 
contribute to reduced hostility in schools and, overall, comparatively better 
educational outcomes for transgender students. 
 
 71 Id. at 44–46.  Specifically, students who reported that they had not experienced discriminatory 
policies or practices at school averaged a GPA of 3.4; those who reported that they had experi-
enced a low level of gender-expression based victimization averaged a 3.3; and those who re-
ported a high level of gender-expression based victimization averaged a 2.9.  Id. at 44 tbl. 1.7. 
 72 ANN P. HAAS & PHILIP L. RODGERS, AM. FOUND. FOR SUICIDE PREVENTION, SUICIDE ATTEMPTS AMONG 
TRANSGENDER AND GENDER NON-CONFORMING ADULTS: FINDINGS OF THE NATIONAL TRANSGENDER 
DISCRIMINATION SURVEY 2 (2014). 
 73 SANDY E. JAMES ET AL., THE REPORT OF THE 2015 U.S. TRANSGENDER SURVEY 4, 115 (2016). 
 74 Id. at 132. 
 75 Julia Raifman et al., Difference-in-Differences Analysis of the Association Between State Same-Sex 
Marriage Policies and Adolescent Suicide Attempts, 171 JAMA PEDIATRICS 350, 355 (2017). 
 76 Id. 
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 2.  Legal Ripple Effects 
Like Brown, Gloucester County is likely to lead to other federal legal 
changes, although for various reasons it is likely to have a more limited legal 
impact than Brown.  This is not to suggest that Gloucester County is insig-
nificant, but rather that Brown had such an outsized impact. 
A quick summary of federal legal changes that occurred in the decade 
after Brown and grew out of the Civil Rights Movement is as follows: In 1957 
Congress created the Civil Rights Division in the Department of Justice as 
well as the U.S. Commission on Civil Rights;77 in 1960 it introduced criminal 
penalties for obstructing federal court orders including those enforcing ra-
cial equality;78 in 1964 it prohibited discrimination in public schools and 
public accommodations, and also authorized the Attorney General to bring 
suit on behalf of plaintiffs in school desegregation cases;79 in 1965 it passed 
the Voting Rights Act;80 and in 1968 it passed the Fair Housing Act.81  In the 
Executive Branch, the Department of Education conditioned the receipt of 
federal funding, which was newly available in 1965 due to the Elementary 
and Secondary Education Act, on desegregation; also around that time the 
Department of Justice began to initiate dozens of desegregation lawsuits 
across the country.82  Brown alone did not cause all of these changes, of 
course, but it undoubtedly marks a turning point, even though many signif-
icant challenges remain today.  Only history will tell if the same is true of 
Gloucester County. 
At this point in time, the Executive Branch appears likely to echo 
Gloucester County’s protections of transgender men and women via in-
creasing agency action and executive orders.  Although this is movement 
further down a path, it is not a change in direction because President Clin-
ton has supported and authorized various such policy changes without fan-
fare since she was inaugurated in January 2017.  It is uncertain whether 
these additional, expected changes will be the focus of a major public cam-
paign or whether the President will continue to take a quieter approach as 
she did while Secretary of State, when she authorized passports to be is-
sued bearing a transgender person’s gender identity with only a note from 
 
 77 Civil Rights Act of 1957, Pub. L. No. 85-315, § 101, 71 Stat. 634 (1957). 
 78 Civil Rights Act of 1960, Pub. L. No. 86-449, 74 Stat. 86 (1960) (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. 
§ 73). 
 79 Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, § 301(a), 78 Stat. 241, 246 (1964).  
 80 Voting Rights Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-110, 79 Stat. 437 (1965). 
 81 Fair Housing Act, Pub. L. No. 90-284, § 801, 82 Stat. 73, 81 (1968). 
 82 Gary Orfield, Education and Civil Rights: Lessons of Six Decades and Challenges of a Changed So-
ciety, in THE PURSUIT OF RACIAL AND ETHNIC EQUALITY IN PUBLIC SCHOOLS: MENENDEZ, BROWN, AND BEYOND 
405, 407–09 (Kristi Bowman ed., 2015). 
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his or her doctor.83  No bills have yet been introduced in Congress, though 
presumably when the summer recess ends in September, a range of pro-
posals (both echoing Gloucester County’s protections and protesting them) 
will start to make their way through committees.  The Republican-con-
trolled Congress84 seems unlikely to build on Gloucester County’s holding, 
although if this issue continues to gain momentum, it could play into the 
2018 mid-term elections in a significant way or, as noted above, it could 
influence the 2020 presidential election.  This is the way in which Gloucester 
County’s protections are the most vulnerable—Brown was a unanimous de-
cision grounded in equality principles, while Gloucester County was a split 
decision focused on deferring to agency authority.  Under a different Presi-
dent, much if not all of this approach could be undone.  
Even if the Executive Branch and the Legislative Branch follow Glouces-
ter County’s lead, though, it is unlikely that Gloucester County will have the 
same sort of domino effect in Supreme Court jurisprudence that Brown 
did.85  Again, although the outcome of Brown and Gloucester County is the 
same at one level—a minority group prevailed on an equality claim in the 
context of public schools—the reasoning of the cases is fundamentally dif-
ferent.  Although the Court may issue a decision in a transgender case in 
the future that is grounded in equality claims like Brown, Gloucester County 
was not that decision.  Independent of what may happen in the federal Ex-
ecutive or Legislative Branch, or in the Supreme Court, Gloucester County 
raises many questions that will be presented in lower courts in the coming 
years. 
3.  More Questions Than Answers 
Finally, like Brown,86 it seems inevitable that Gloucester County is the 
beginning of a long string of litigation, especially since Gloucester County 
based its holding on administrative deference rather than equality,87 and 
also because attacks on transgender individuals appear to be the new focus 
 
 83 Michael Kruse, ‘My Country Accepts Me as a Woman,’ POLITICO (July 1, 2016), https://www.polit-
ico.com/magazine/story/2016/07/hillary-clinton-2016-transgender-rights-passport-policy-state-
department-lgbt-equality-214007. 
 84 Mark Z. Barbarak & Lisa Mascaro, Republicans Hold the House and Senate, But Will That End 
Washington Gridlock Even with President Trump?, L.A. TIMES (Nov. 9, 2016, 12:10 AM), 
http://www.latimes.com/politics/la-na-pol-election-congress-control-20161108-story.html. 
 85 See Jack M. Balkin, Plessy, Brown, and Grutter: A Play in Three Acts, 26 CARDOZO L. REV. 1689, 1711–
12 (2005) (describing how the analysis in Brown shaped the development of tiered levels of scru-
tiny and their application to subsequent equal protection cases).  
 86 The Supreme Court was consumed by the issue of school desegregation through much of the 
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SCHOOLS: MENENDEZ, BROWN, AND BEYOND (Kristi Bowman, ed., 2015). 
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of the culture war.88  Furthermore, practically speaking, Gloucester County 
establishes transgender students’ rights regarding public school bathroom 
access.  It does not address classification of students, locker room access, 
sports, the relationship between disability-based claims and gender-based 
claims, or many other questions, although it effectively defers to the signif-
icant guidance that addresses some of these claims.  
First, the school district defendant in Gloucester County expressed con-
cern about uncertainty regarding how it is to know or assume whether stu-
dents are transgender; although presented as a concern about avoiding 
moral or legal liability for unintentionally discriminating, this appears re-
lated to a more general concern that students will feign transgender status 
to gain access to restrooms or other facilities reserved for the other sex.  
This is possible, however the risk can be reduced significantly because 
states and school districts can regulate what documentation is required to 
accommodate transgender students’ transitions—and most already did 
even before Gloucester County.89  The regulations ranged from requiring 
only a student’s statement, to requiring a note from a parent or medical 
provider, to mandating court-ordered name change or birth certificate.90  
The states with the most restrictive regulations may need to amend their 
approach to comply with Gloucester County, and disputes over how much 
they can require are likely to result in litigation.  The 2016 guidance is not 
clear on what a school may require, and the agreement to which the guid-
ance refers in footnote 11 allows a school to require “documentation that 
[a] change [to legal name or gender] has been made pursuant to a court 
order, amendment of state- or federally-issued identification, or other ap-
propriate documentation.”91 
Second, regarding locker rooms, students’ privacy concerns are without 
a doubt greater in locker rooms than in bathrooms.  The 2016 guidance re-
quires locker-room access consistent with students’ gender identity and 
 
 88 Steve Sanders, Why the Supreme Court Should Dismiss the Gavin Grimm Case, ACSBLOG (Feb. 27, 
2017), https://www.acslaw.org/acsblog/why-the-supreme-court-should-dismiss-the-gavin-
grimm-case. A significant event that actually did occur in July 2017—President Trump’s announce-
ment that transgender individuals would no longer be allowed to serve in the military—bears out 
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 89 Allison S. Bohm et al., Challenges Facing LGBT Youth, 17 GEO. J. GENDER & L. 125, 140 (2016). 
 90 Although this is not a perfect system—for example, students without supportive parents are likely 
much less able to gain access to medical providers or courts, not to mention a parental note—
even that dilemma is not entirely unique.  See id. at 166–70.  For example, the judicial bypass 
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ments).  
 91 Voluntary Resolution Agreement, Central Piedmont Community College, OCR Complaint 11-14-
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prohibits mandatory “use of individual-user facilities when other students 
are not required to do so.”92  As Professors George Cunningham and Erin 
Buzuvis highlight, concerns about privacy in communal showers and chang-
ing areas are wide-spread, impacting both transgender and cisgender stu-
dents.93  Thus, new school buildings plan for greater privacy in locker rooms, 
and existing school buildings are being retrofitted with the ceiling-mounted 
curtains common in doctors’ offices.94  Practical solutions that accommo-
date the privacy interests of all students often are possible.95  Furthermore, 
of the few lawsuits brought by cisgender students who do not want 
transgender students in their locker rooms one recently was allowed to pro-
ceed but without the preliminary injunction the cisgender plaintiffs re-
quested and others have been withdrawn or not yet decided.96  Given the 
heightened sensitivity of the privacy concerns, it is expected that this will 
continue to be a focus of substantial litigation and a vehicle to challenge the 
departments’ Title IX interpretation in court. 
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a-transgender-thing-74023. 
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 95 See id. (showing that privacy screens and single-stall, gender neutral bathrooms are practical and 
inexpensive responses to students’ concerns about privacy); see generally Cubicle Curtains, 
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https:/www.nytimes.com/roomfordebate/2015/11/05/transgender-students-in-high-school-
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Treatment is Discrimination, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 5, 2015, 3:21 AM), https://www.nytimes.com/room-
fordebate/2015/11/05/transgender-students-in-high-school-locker-rooms/for-transgender-stu-
dents-disparate-treatment-is-discrimination (arguing that transgender students should be al-
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& Parents For Privacy v. United States Dep’t of Educ., No. 16-cv-04945 (N.D. Ill. May 4, 2016); Eric 
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22, 2017, 9:54 AM), http://www.dailyherald.com/news/20170522/transgender-studentx2019s-
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months ago.  See generally Complaint, Doe v. Boyertown Area Sch. Dist., No. 17-1249 (E.D. Pa. 
Mar. 21, 2017); 2017 WL 3675418 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 25, 2017) (denying a preliminary injunction).  And, 
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Third, school sports present another interesting question, and nearly 8 
million high school students participate in high school athletics each year.97  
Again, this is a question that the guidance addresses, more or less requiring 
schools to permit transgender students to participate in a single-sex sport 
consistent with their gender identity.98  Additionally, state athletic associa-
tions already have been addressing this question.  According to 
TRANSATHELETE.com, as of mid-2017, sixteen states’ athletic associations 
permit transgender students to participate on the teams of the gender with 
which they identify, and another twenty states require either medical treat-
ment or the evaluation of situations on a case-by-case basis for the same 
result.99  Additionally, seven states require a birth certificate change and/or 
surgery and other medical treatment, and the remaining seven states have 
no policy.100  The group of twenty states seems to follow the lead of the 
International Olympic Committee and NCAA, which both permit 
transgender athletes to compete with the gender with which they identify 
so long as transgender women’s testosterone levels are consistent with 
those of cisgender women.101  Similar to the locker-room issue, other issues 
complicate this approach, such as the regular lack of insurance coverage for 
hormonal or other transgender-related medical treatment, and necessity of 
parental support for transgender students to be able to receive medical 
treatment of any sort, which may be part of what has led to sixteen states 
permitting participation more freely, along with the lower-stakes nature of 
high school athletics.  Litigation regarding athletic participation has been 
much slower to take off, and like the locker room issue, this may play out 
through a challenge to the Title IX interpretation and also through the doc-
umentation issue identified above.  
Fourth, a further question is how disability law’s protections will mesh 
with the protections created by the Court, and how much the stigma of 
“disability” will discourage transgender students from pursuing this ap-
proach.102  A counterpoint to disability stigma is that much of federal disa-
bility law is focused on creating a school-level mediation process to resolve 
claims, as opposed to litigation, which could be a more productive structure 
 
 97 NAT’L FED’N OF STATE HIGH SCH. ASS’NS, 2015–16 HIGH SCHOOL ATHLETICS PARTICIPATION SURVEY 55 (2016), 
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 99 High School Policies for Transgender Athletes, TRANSATHLETE.COM, https://www.transath-
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policies) (last visited Dec. 23, 2017). 
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 102 Hannah Stocker, Note, She’s the Man, 2017 MICH. ST. L. REV. (forthcoming 2017); see also Bohm, 
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for resolving these conflicts.103 Indeed, a 2014 transgender student case in 
Maine discussed how a school-level group of school staff and the student’s 
parents convened every year to make a plan for the student’s success under 
Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act.104  The number of transgender cases 
brought under disability law is low so far, but appears to be increasing and 
may be gaining momentum.105 
Whatever Gloucester County’s legacy turns out to be, though, whether 
it follows the path anticipated in this Part or a different one, it is hard to 
imagine that the decision will not have immense symbolic and practical sig-
nificance for the transgender community, at least in the short term.  Addi-
tionally, Gloucester County may well be the decision that breaks the ice, and 
it seems almost certain that it will not be a decision that is the end of the 
story.  Thus, in some significant ways, Gloucester County may well be the 
Brown v. Board of transgender rights. 
II.  RETURNING TO REALITY  
We know, of course, that the reality in which we live is quite different 
from the alternative sketched out immediately above.  The President is 
Donald Trump, not Hillary Clinton; the Court never heard argument in 
Gloucester County much less decided the case; and in summer 2017, the 
country was discussing President Trump’s announcement that transgender 
men and women would be banned from serving in the U.S. military,106 not 
processing Gavin Grimm’s victory in the Supreme Court.  Other than some 
lamenting what could have been, though, how does the counterfactual his-
tory above change our perspective of the present reality?  This Part at-
tempts to answer that question.  First, I explore the plausibility of other 
outcomes in Gloucester County, given the actual outcome of the 2016 Pres-
idential election; second, I analyze ongoing transgender student bathroom 
and locker room litigation and project the direction of that litigation; third, 
I emphasize the opportunity for states, school districts, schools, and state 
athletic associations to protect transgender students even in the absence 
of a federal directive, given the profoundly negative outcomes associated 
with a lack of protections and the potentially significant consequences of 
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greater protections and interventions.  
A.  Other Outcomes 
As law professor Cass Sunstein observed, counterfactual history lets us 
test our explanation about what happened and why.107  Admittedly, it is 
difficult to seriously entertain the idea that anything could have happened 
other than what did, and that may seem especially true in this situation.  I 
have argued above that if Hillary Clinton prevailed in the 2016 presidential 
election, the Gloucester County case would have turned out differently.  
But, since Donald Trump prevailed, was the actual course of events the only 
viable one?  It appears so. 
To play out that argument, let us first consider the Trump Administra-
tion’s range of policies that are mostly but not universally unsupportive of 
transgender individuals.108  With this context, it is hard to imagine that the 
Trump Administration would have left the high-profile school transgender 
policy in place for much longer than it did, especially with the Gloucester 
County case pending and set for argument in March 2017.  Specifically, with 
regard to Gloucester County, the Trump Administration presumably would 
not have wanted to chance adverse precedent on transgender issues by let-
ting the case play out.  Rescinding the Department of Education’s and Jus-
tice’s policy was the best way to achieve that result because that meant the 
administrative law question was off the table.109  Although the Court still 
could have chosen to engage only the Title IX statutory interpretation ques-
tion (and the parties had briefed the issue), it was peripheral to the Fourth 
Circuit’s decision.110  Thus, in retrospect, it would have been highly unlikely 
for the Court to keep the case on its docket after the Trump Administration 
reversed the federal government’s position. 
If for some reason the Court had heard the case on March 28 as origi-
nally scheduled, though, Justice Gorsuch would have missed oral argument 
because he was not confirmed until April 7.111  However, he almost certainly 
could have participated in the decision because it seems nearly impossible 
the Court would have issued its decision in this case in less than two weeks, 
more likely waiting (as assumed above in the counterfactual history) until 
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the end of June.112  On the merits, Justice Gorsuch would have been likely 
to align with the Court’s three conservatives.113  For the reasons discussed 
above, Justice Kennedy would have been likely to align with the Court’s 
more liberal wing,114 resulting in a 5-4 decision (or 5-3 without Justice Gor-
such participating).  However, Justice Kennedy’s outcome was hardly pre-
ordained,115 and it is possible that he would have aligned with the conserva-
tives.  Ultimately, that the Court vacated the Fourth Circuit’s decision and 
remanded the case suggests that at least a couple of Justices in the erst-
while majority were more than a little reluctant about this course of action.  
Thus, when President Trump was elected, it appears that the die was 
cast for Gloucester County. 
B.  Transgender Student Bathroom and Locker Room Litigation: What 
Comes Next 
A handful of transgender student cases are making their way through 
federal courts across the country,116 and one of these (in addition to 
Gloucester County) already has resulted in a petition for a writ of certio-
rari.117  A summary of the three pending and two recently settled 
transgender student cases begins this sub-Part, followed by a brief discus-
sion of what lawyers involved in these cases and others can learn from the 
actual events and from the hypothetical events presented above. 
To begin, the pending cases.  First, the Supreme Court remanded Gavin 
Grimm’s case to the Fourth Circuit in March 2017 after vacating the deci-
sion, and in August 2017 the Fourth Circuit remanded the case to the dis-
trict court to develop the record regarding mootness.118  If the case is not 
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moot, the Fourth Circuit presumably will consider the Title IX and Equal Pro-
tection Clause claims.  If the case continues to be assigned to the same 
panel or heard en banc, plaintiffs will know at least one judge leans in their 
favor—in April 2017, a judge assigned to Gloucester County echoed Justice 
Kennedy’s equal dignity approach:119 
G.G.’s case is about much more than bathrooms.  It’s about a boy asking 
his school to treat him just like any other boy.  It’s about protecting the 
rights of transgender people in public spaces and not forcing them exist on 
the margins.  It’s about governmental validation of the existence and expe-
riences of transgender people, as well as the simple recognition of their 
humanity.  His case is part of a larger movement that is redefining and 
broadening the scope of civil and human rights so that they extend to a 
vulnerable group that has traditionally been unrecognized, unrepresented, 
and unprotected.120 
Although the judge who penned those words stepped down from the 
bench at the end of August 2017, the judge who joined his opinion re-
mains.121 
Second, in December 2016 while the Obama Administration’s guidance 
remained in effect, the Sixth Circuit affirmed an Ohio federal district court’s 
decision to grant a preliminary injunction sought by transgender students 
in a restroom access case.122  In August 2017, the district court struck some 
of the school district’s affirmative defenses with prejudice, struck others 
without prejudice, and allowed still other defenses to stand.123  This case 
continues to be active in the district court. 
Third, in October 2016 a federal magistrate judge in Illinois relied heavily 
on the Title IX guidance when recommending that the district court deny 
the preliminary injunction sought by cisgender students who opposed the 
school district’s policy of allowing locker room access to transgender stu-
dents consistent with their gender identity.124  The district court has yet to 
issue its ruling, although the parties continued through August 2017 to brief 
the report and to argue about what the record should contain.125  
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Additionally, two cases have recently settled. In February 2017, on the 
heels of the Trump Administration rescinding the Obama Administration’s 
guidance, a federal district court in Pennsylvania granted a preliminary in-
junction sought by transgender students in a restroom access case, relying 
on Equal Protection arguments.126  In August 2017, the parties settled the 
case, which was voluntarily dismissed.127 
And, in May 2017, the Seventh Circuit affirmed the preliminary injunc-
tion a Wisconsin federal district court granted to a transgender student in 
a restroom access case; the underlying decision relied primarily on Title IX 
and secondarily on the Equal Protection Clause.128  In fall 2017, the school 
district filed a petition for a writ of certiorari, as mentioned above.129  The 
Court extended the deadline for the response to the petition four times, 
most recently extending it to January 26, 2017.130  Then, on January 9, 2018, 
the school board approved an $800,000 settlement in the case and also de-
cided to withdraw its petition for certiorari.131 
Overall, the trend in these five cases is to allow transgender students 
access to sex-segregated spaces consistent with their gender identity.  
Given the lack of federal policy, the increasing visibility of these issues, and 
the fact that plaintiffs can either be transgender students seeking access or 
cisgender students opposing transgender students’ access, it seems highly 
likely that the number of cases will continue to grow.  
For various reasons, the transgender students’ advocates in the cases 
described above and those that will inevitably follow in their footsteps 
would be well-advised to adjust course.  Because of the federal govern-
ment’s change in position under the Trump Administration and the actual 
disposition of Gloucester County, transgender students and their allies are 
no longer able to rely on the federal government for legal authority via the 
policy letter or the significant guidance or for support in other ways, such 
as assisting in a case by filing an amicus brief.  More specifically, all parties 
will continue to make arguments about what Title IX requires, though in this 
regard transgender students and their allies would be wise to rely on Title 
VII employment law case law as they do so, because of the federal executive 
branch’s reticence.132  
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Because of this and also due to the current composition of the Court, 
transgender students’ advocates stand to benefit from a greater focus on 
Equal Protection-based arguments than they have employed to date.  As 
articulated above, Justice Kennedy arguably is amenable to deciding a case 
like Gloucester County in favor of a transgender student via a dignity-based 
argument.133  However, the publication of this piece at the end of January 
2018 marks the end of the first year of President Trump’s first term, and the 
Court’s membership could change greatly during his term.  Although no Jus-
tices currently are rumored to be retiring, three years is a long time, and 
early in summer 2017 the speculation that Justice Kennedy would step 
down any day reached a “fever pitch.”134  In April 2017, Congress confirmed 
the solidly conservative Justice Neil Gorsuch, President Trump’s choice to 
succeed the late Justice Scalia.135  If Justice Kennedy were to retire in the 
next few years, it seems highly unlikely that his successor would be as re-
ceptive to Equal Protection arguments as he has been, and since Justice 
Kennedy has been a swing vote on this issue and others, it would be too 
late for transgender students to hope to prevail in the Supreme Court. 
A focus on Equal Protection arguments need not be driven by Justice 
Kennedy’s presence on the Court, though.  Indeed, the current transgender 
rights cases have much to build on in Justice Kennedy’s “equal dignity” ju-
risprudence as they work their way through lower federal courts.136  Addi-
tionally, the federal bench was shaped significantly during President 
Obama’s eight years in office—thirty percent of federal appeals judges and 
forty percent of federal district court judges were nominated and con-
firmed during the Obama Administration.137  However, in just one year in 
office, President Trump has made more headway on judicial nominations 
than presidents have for decades.138  That said, not all Obama (or Demo-
cratic) appointees would necessarily side with transgender students, nor 
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(describing a Tenth Circuit opinion authored by now-Justice Gorsuch). 
 136 Tribe, supra note 41, passim. 
 137 This does not include judges who have taken senior status.  The United States Courts’ website 
contains a list of the total number of federal judgeships and also the total number of federal 
judgeship appointments by individual Presidents.  Authorized Judgeships, U.S. CTS. (2016), 
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would all Bush, Trump (or Republican) appointees necessarily side against 
them.  Interestingly, one of the two Fourth Circuit judges quoted earlier in 
this section in Gavin Grimm’s case was appointed to the federal district 
court by President George W. Bush and the other by President Bill Clinton, 
though both were elevated to the Fourth Circuit by President Obama.139  
Nevertheless, the critical mass of Obama-appointees on the bench is im-
portant when considering that many throughout the federal judiciary may 
be open to Justice Kennedy’s arguments or to other, similar approaches.  
Additionally, it may be that, in the end, litigating transgender rights 
cases under the Equal Protection Clause rather than Title IX provides a 
cleaner way to engage the questions of discrimination via the scrutiny lev-
els140 while our common understandings about sex and gender change over 
time. 
In the interim, it would not be a surprise if the five pending and recently 
settled transgender bathroom and locker room cases soon become fifteen 
or more.  Those seeking access for transgender students—whether 
transgender students and their parents bringing suit or a school district de-
fending a suit brought by cisgender students—would be wise to make Title 
IX-based arguments that import reasoning from Title VII employment law 
cases, and to double down on Equal Protection.  
C.  State and Local Action 
The alternative reality presented above is one in which transgender stu-
dents’ health, safety, and educational outcomes improve as a result of a 
fictional Supreme Court decision in Gloucester County giving Gavin Grimm 
the right to use the restroom consistent with his gender identity, and thus 
extending that protection to all transgender students.  Judicial decisions are 
not the only way to accomplish social change, though, and arguably they 
are not even the best way to do so.141  Importantly, although the Trump 
Administration’s 2017 guidance rolls back the clock on transgender protec-
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land/baltimore-city/bs-md-ci-andre-davis-profile-20171004-story.html; Judge Henry F. Floyd U.S. 
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court/judge-henry-f-floyd (last visited Nov. 11, 2017).  
 140 See Kristi L. Bowman, The Failure of Education Federalism, MICH. J.L. REFORM (forthcoming 2017) 
(manuscript at 1, 5, 48–49), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2876889 (pro-
posing a litigation strategy centered on pairing an educational quality right under substantive due 
process with “rational basis with bite review” under the Equal Protection Clause).   
 141 GERALD N. ROSENBURG, THE HOLLOW HOPE: CAN COURTS BRING ABOUT SOCIAL CHANGE?, passim (Benjamin 
I. Page ed. 1991). 
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states and school districts from extending protections to transgender stu-
dents.142  Thus, transgender students’ advocates should continue pursuing 
policy change at the school- and state-level.  
Although the controversial nature of transgender rights today would 
prevent protections in some communities and states and make them diffi-
cult to achieve in many others, there also are reasons to think that many 
states and communities may be receptive to this.  If so, this would hardly 
be the first contemporary civil rights issue to gain traction at the state and 
local level: For example, between 2000 and 2015, both civil unions/same-
sex marriage and school bullying prohibitions expanded substantially at the 
state level.  Thirty-seven states permitted same-sex marriage before the Su-
preme Court’s 2013 decision made the issue a federal one,143 and although 
Georgia was the first to adopt an anti-school bullying statute in 1999, by 
2015 Montana became the fiftieth.144  
It may be that the legal protection of transgender students is effectively 
fought on the state battlefield as well.  Schools, school districts, and state 
athletic associations are already engaging with questions about how to ac-
commodate transgender students.145  To be sure, not all school districts’ 
and states’ policies protect transgender students, or protect them to the 
extent transgender advocates may want.  Indeed, transgender students are 
protected by statewide anti-discrimination laws in only 13 states and the 
District of Columbia.146  However, there is substantially more engagement 
with these issues at the school level and school district level, and in state 
athletic associations, than an outside observer might imagine.  Additionally, 
policy advocacy can be customized to individual states or communities and 
can range from pursuing the broad anti-discrimination provisions men-
tioned above, to achieving minor facility modifications that enhance com-
fort for all students such as privacy curtains in locker rooms, and greater 
privacy in bathrooms, to creating respectful accommodations for one par-
ticular student.147  It is also important that public opinion suggests that our 
 
 142 Battle & Wheeler, supra note 3. 
 143 The Pew Research Center offers an excellent interactive map that chronicles states’ civil union/ 
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society is moving in a more inclusive direction regarding transgender indi-
viduals, who already enjoy a critical mass of support.148 
Under this view, the present lack of federal protections for transgender 
students is a short-term problem.  Even if that is so, however, there are real 
costs to delaying protections, and the costs will most easily be mitigated if 
states, school districts, schools, and state athletic associations take it upon 
themselves to protect transgender students.  
CONCLUSION 
This piece presented a robust counterfactual narrative with the goal of 
helping us reflect on our present reality.  In the parallel universe, Gavin 
Grimm prevailed in the Supreme Court on an administrative law argument 
with Justice Kennedy casting his vote for the transgender student in what 
was in some ways (though not in others) “the transgender movement’s 
Brown v. Board of Education.”  Even under this fictional set of circum-
stances, many bitter legal battles remained ahead, although transgender 
individuals and their allies celebrated the symbolic and practical signifi-
cance of the decision.   
The purpose of a counterfactual history is not to seek solace in thoughts 
of “what might have been” or to rejoice about what did not happen, 
though, but rather to gain a fresh perspective on what is.  To that end, I 
have leveraged the counterfactual history to argue that the presidential 
election in fall 2016 determined whether federal policy would remain un-
changed and thus whether Gloucester County would be heard in the Su-
preme Court; even those who disagree with my counterfactual result of the 
case would likely agree with this.  Additionally, I also have used it to gain 
insight into the type and extent of current controversies and to better ex-
plain why the current cases about transgender bathrooms and locker rooms 
are likely to become more plentiful.  Furthermore, given the actual outcome 
in Gloucester County combined with Justice Kennedy’s “equal dignity” juris-
prudence, I contend that transgender students and their advocates in these 
cases would be wise to focus on the Equal Protection Clause (and, I note 
briefly, to draw on Title VII precedent when making Title IX arguments).  Fi-
nally, the Trump Administration’s guidance does not prohibit states and 
school districts from guaranteeing transgender students access to sex-seg-
regated spaces consistent with their gender identity, and under the coun-
terfactual history we see the potentially significant, albeit indirect, im-
portance of legal recognition and protections. People of good will should 
seek to implement policies that protect transgender students because 
these protections, statements of belonging and acceptance, can make a real 
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difference.  We must learn from what might have been as we decide what 
will be. 
 
